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Since the end of the Second World War and the establishment of the
United Nations, more than fifty bilateral and collective defense treaties
have come into effect. Most of them have among their parties at least
one of the superpowers, either the United States or Russia. This devel-
opment of leviathan blocs of international power has changed the funda-
mental nature of the United Nations, which was conceived to be the sole
body of collective security. Trygve Lie once said: "If people generally
began to accept alliances as substitute for a genuine, world-wide collec-
tive security, then the hope of a lasting peace would be greatly endan-
gered."' However, the founders of the United Nations, aware of the
potential for the formation of collective defense organizations, provided
for them in the framework of the United Nations. It was hoped that
these organizations would develop a normative potential to aid in the
creation and preservation of a stable international order without hinder-
ing progress towards systemic harmony.
Collective-security organizations are a relatively recent development
within the international community. Dexter Perkins points out that they
were an outgrowth of the optimism of the nineteenth century, a time in
which men thought that peace could be secured through law. 2 For the
preceding two hundred and fifty years a system of balance of power, an
outgrowth of the Treaty of Westphalia3 which established a balance of
power between Protestant and Catholic states,4 had been dominant in
the international system. In 1919 the family of nations decided to try a
new approach to regulating their interactions; they undertook to end the
*Department of Government, Florida State University.
'Quoted in Hearings on the North Atlantic Treaty Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign
Relations, 81st Cong., Ist Sess., pt. 3, at 892 (1949).
ID. PERKINS, AMERICA'S QUEST FOR PEACE 49-50 (1962).
'The Peace of Westphalia consisted of two treaties: the Treaty of Peace Between France and
the Empire, Oct. 24, 1648, I CONSOLIDATED TREATY SERIES 271 (C. Parry ed. 1969) and the Treaty
of Peace Between Sweden and the Roman Empire, Oct. 14, 1648, I CONSOLIDATED TREATY SERIES
119 (C. Parry ed. 1969). The former treaty is known as the Treaty of Westphalia (or the Treaty
of Munster) and the latter, as the Treaty of Osnabruck.
'Gross, The Peace of Westphalia, 1648-1948, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY 25, 27 (L. Gross ed. 1969). The Gross article provides an excellent history of the
continued influence of the Peace of Westphalia.
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Machiavellian balance-of-power system which had predominated for
centuries and supplant it with the Wilsonian assumptions of organized
international relations. The formation of the League of Nations signaled
the first time that the majority of nations of the world had agreed to
settle their disputes collectively and without resort to force. A system
of general collective security, it was thought, would provide the stability
that the fluid system of shifting alliances had been unable to accomplish.
Some years later, the president of the United Nations General Assem-
bly, Dr. Herbert V. Evatt, stated that the League of Nations failed to
prevent the Second World War solely because some of its member
governments preferred to resume the great game of power politics and
let down the League.5
In 1945 the founders of the United Nations attempted to establish and
redefine a universal approach to international security. They envisioned
the United Nations as the sole collective-security organization. Further,
they assumed that international cooperation would be of sufficient mea-
sure for the organization to provide security for the international com-
munity as a whole.' Pragmatically, however, they recognized that cer-
tain groups of nations (e.g., Arab League7 and Act of Chapultepec)
either had or would sometime have regional agreements and that these
organizations should therefore be provided for in the United Nations
Charter so that they could function as part of the general collective-
security system.' Additionally, the founders realized that mechanisms
of response to breaches of the peace within the United Nations would
perhaps, unavoidably, function slowly; thus they provided that nations
or groups of nations would have the right of individual and collective
self-defense.10
It is the embodiment of these considerations" in the Charter of the
United Nations that has been used in support of the formation of
collective-defense organizations. This discussion will include an exami-
nation of some of the normative questions which arise from conflict
between general collective security, as provided for by the United Na-
'N.Y. Times, Apr. 6, 1949, at 6, col. 1.
6See U.N. CHARTER art. 1.
'Pact of the League of Arab States, March 22, 1949, 70 U.N.T.S. 237.
'Agreement on Reciprocal Assistance and Solidarity, Mar. 8, 1945, in INTER-AMERICAN CON-
FERENCE ON PROBLEMS OF WAR AND PEACE, MEXICO CITY, FEBRUARY 21-MARCH 8, 1945, at 30-
33 (Pan American Union, Congress and Conference Series No. 47, 1945), 60 Stat. 1831, T.I.A.S.
No. 1543.
'The relationship between regional organizations and the United Nations is described in U.N.
CHARTER arts. 52-54.
'"See U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
"U.N. CHARTER art. I, para. I and arts. 51-54.
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tions Charter, and collective-defense organizations. The particular ques-
tions that will be considered are: (1) How does the Charter affect the
right of collective defense? (2) What are some of the juridical bases of
the right of collective defense? (3) Are collective-defense pacts consistent
with the United Nations Charter?
Several provisions of the United Nations Charter have already been
mentioned; it may be well at this point to discuss how they have been
interpreted and, thus, how they affect the right of collective self-defense.
First, article l(1) of the Charter states that one of the purposes of the
United Nations is "to take effective collective measures for the preven-
tion and removal of threats to the peace and for the suppression of acts
of aggression . . . ." It would seem that the location of this provision
under article 1, which specifically defines the purposes of the United
Nations, indicates that there was no intention to define collective-
defense organizations as outside the United Nations.
Second, article 51 states that "[n]othing in the present Charter shall
impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an
armed attack occurs. . . ." By the exclusion of article 51 from chapter
VIII,11 which deals with regional arrangements, and by the limitation
of the right to instances of armed attack, it would appear that the article
was intended to include ad hoc agreements or actions and not preesta-
blished collective self-defense organizations.
Finally, chapter VIII13 of the Charter provides specifically for re-
gional arrangements for the maintenance of international peace and
security, provided that such arrangements and their activities are consis-
tent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations." It is also
provided in chapter VIII that U.N. members that enter into such ar-
rangements shall make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local
disputes 5 and that no enforcement action should be taken without au-
thorization from the Security Council.'" These regional organizations,
fundamentally nonmilitary, but perhaps political, are potentially valua-
ble extensions of the United Nations to deal effectively and rapidly with
local disputes and thereby to increase the efficiency of the Security
Council in its role as peacekeeper.
The right of a nation to defend itself against external aggression is a
long-established principle of international law which is incorporated in
"U.N. CHARTER arts. 52-54.
13Id.
"U.N. CHARTER art. 52, para. I.
"U.N. CHARTER art. 52, para. 2.
"
5 U.N. CHARTER art. 53.
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the Charter 7 of the United Nations. But it was not until the early
nineteenth century that any real attempt was made to define the limits
on the right of self-defense. The Caroline Doctrine 8 established as a
condition for the application of the right that here be an instant and
overwhelming necessity for self-defense, leaving no choice of means and
no moment for deliberation. 9 Article 51 of the Charter further limited
the right of self-defense by restricting the authority of member nations
to act, to situations where "an armed attack occurs"; this provision
would appear to preclude preemptive strikes, which might otherwise be
lawful under the Caroline Doctrine.
The right of a nation to defend itself may be extended to multina-
tional situations. In a hypothetical alliance-free world, collective defense
is an option that a state may exercise in the event of armed attack upon
another state. In this setting, the option to come to the aid of another
state is open until exercised, and decisions can be made on the merits
of an individual case. However, with the formation of collective-defense
organizations, a nation theoretically elects in advance how it will act,
without reference to the particular situation at hand. The obligation is
usually framed contractually by language such as, "an attack on one is
an attack on all." 0 On a normative level, it seems difficult to understand
how a contractual agreement between state P (protector) and state D
(defender) to treat an attack by state A (attacker) on state D as an
assault on state P is necessarily substantive; but such treaties do exist,
and attempts have been made to have them appear consistent with the
United Nations Charter. Declarations of faith in the general collective
security by the United Nations, and particularly by article 51 and chap-
ter VIII, are used to justify regional organizations and make their estab-
lishment, by implication, consistent with the inherent right of individual
or collective self-defense.
Nevertheless, no inherent right can generate from a hypothetical con-
"
7See, e.g., U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
t
"For a discussion of the episode during which the Caroline, an American vessel, was destroyed
while in an American port during the Canadian insurrection of 1837 and the subsequent exchange
of notes between the American and British governments, see 2 J. MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 409-14 (1906).
"See Note from Secretary of State Webster to Lord Ashburton, British plenipotentiary, Aug.
6, 1842, quoted in part, 2 J. MOORE, supra note 18, at 412.
"See, e.g., Treaty of Friendship Co-operation and Mutual Assistance Between Albania, Bul-
garia, Hungary, German Democratic Republic, Poland, Romania, Union of Soviet Socialist Re-
publics and Czechoslovakia (Warsaw Pact), May 14, 1955, art. 4,219 U.N.T.S. 3; Security Treaty
Between Australia, New Zealand and the United States (ANZUS Pact), Sept. I, 1951, art. 4,
[1952] 3 U.S.T. 3420, T.I.A.S. No. 2493, 131 U.N.T.S. 83; North Atlantic Treaty (NATO Pact),
Apr. 4, 1949, art. 5, 63 Stat. 2241 (1949), T.I.A.S. No. 1964, 34 U.N.T.S. 243.
[Vol. 2, Supp. 1: 139
INDIVIDUAL & COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENSE
struct or deeming clause. Perhaps this extension of the right of self-
defense to the point of forming collective-security organizations outside
the general collective security, theoretically provided by the United Na-
tions, is derived from the assumption that, as in the past, states remain
free to enter into military alliances. Yet, article 103 of the Charter
specifies:
In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of
the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations
under any other international agreement, their obligations under the
present Charter shall prevail.
Objections may be raised over this conflict of commitments. For a state
to provide assistance to another, based on a contractural promise out-
side the context of the Charter, is an admission that a state believes itself
capable of assessing the legality of another nation's claim to the exercise
of self-defense, and in some ways places the state in the position of
judging its own case. Furthermore, a U.N. member state should find it
difficult to reconcile unilateral support of a nation, which it deems to
be acting in self-defense, with its delegation of primary responsibility for
the maintenance of international stability to the Security Council.',
There is an obvious advantage in the use of article 51, rather than
chapter VIII, as primary justification for the formation of collective
self-defense organizations, since article 51 does not require that self-
defensive measures be preceded by notice to or action by the Security
Council. On the other hand, chapter VIII clearly states that no action
shall be taken by a regional organization without the authorization of
the Security Council.2"
There apparently exist two fundamental standards that might logi-
cally be applied to the formation of regional organizations. These are
contiguity and interdependence. In this age of potential atomic war and
Armageddon, theoretical international law notwithstanding, the secu-
rity and stability of neighboring states cannot be ignored. An attack on
a particular member of a collective-security organization might easily
endanger the security of a neighboring state, in which case it may choose
to act under the provisions of article 51. However, other states who are
also members of the same regional organization, but not close enough
to be affected by the attack, might be hard pressed to justify any action
not consistent with article 2. Using NATO as an example, an attack on
Belgium might well affect the Netherlands and France, but not necessar-
"See U.N. CHARTER arts. 39-51.
"U.N. CHARTER art. 53.
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ily Canada or the United States.
To overcome the lack of contiguity, a collective-defense organization
might, as NATO has, turn to interdependence and commonality of
interest as the basis for establishing the organization. To some extent,
NATO has accepted the statement of former U.S. Secretary of State
Dean Acheson that "[tihere is a community of spirit, a community of
history, a community of interest in these Atlantic countries." 3 There
are cases where the interdependence of which Mr. Acheson spoke is
obvious, like the relationship between Great Britain and the United
States; however, this type of interdependence must be separated from
that which is artificially created by political doctrines of expedience or
spheres of influence.
The artificiality of interdependence provided by political expedience
is perhaps best demonstrated by the Czechoslovakian and Soviet actions
during the 1968 uprisings. 24 Additionally, the actions of France vis-h-
vis NATO in the early sixties exemplifies the national propensity to
avoid artificial interdependence. It seems that France was no longer
willing to exchange portions of its sovereignty for dependence on collec-
tive self-defense. Although the pressures applied to France were not as
obvious or successful as in the Soviet-Czechoslovakian situation, the
pressure was nonetheless real.
As a final element of this paper, let us examine three hypothetical
world situations which demonstrate some possible applications of
collective self-defense.
Scenario one is the most simple. An attack on state D by state A is
considered by virtue of a collective self-defense treaty to be an attack
on PI and P2. However both P1 and P2 are distantly situated from D.
D, of course, always has the right of individual self-defense, which is
specifically and clearly defined by the Charter. P1 and P2 ideally would
not act under the Caroline Doctrine," and technically would be pre-
cluded from participation in collective self-defense, since they were not
attacked .26
In a second scenario let us move P1 and P2 close enough to D so that
an actual or threatened attack by A may reasonably be construed a
serious threat of attack on P1 and P2. Here, by virtue of the Caroline
Doctrine, P1 and P2 might participate at their discretion in the defense
"
3Statement of Dean Acheson, Secretary of State, in Hearings on the North Atlantic Treaty
Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. I, at 4, 15.
2 See R. OGLESBY, INTERNAL WAR AND THE SEARCH FOR NORMATIVE ORDER 128-31 (1971);
Oglesby, Use of Force in Bloc Situations pp. 77, 82-86 supra.
"See note 19 and accompanying text supra.
"6See U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
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of D.
The third scenario differs from the second in that P2 is not close
enough to be threatened by the attack on D. In this case only P1 would
be able to act in accordance with the Caroline Doctrine, and P2 would
be constrained not to act.
In each scenario the parties are depicted as acting in accordance with
the provisions of the collective-defense organization and in accordance
with established legal doctrine. One might characterize the reactions as
utopian rather than realistic responses to real-world situations. But be-
fore categorizing the reaction as utopian, it may be well to consider a
fourth hypothetical situation.
The fourth scenario involves P1, a superpower with P2, A and D as
client states. Additionally (P1)' is another superpower with its client
states (P2)', (A)' and (D)'. The conditions described in the first three
scenarios apply to the extent that an attack by state D by state (A)'
involves P1, or conversely an attack on (D)' by state A involves (P1)'.
Since the collective self-defense organizations have made prior decisions
about a course of action to render aid, the superpowers will become
involved to a degree that depends upon "thresholds of involvement" in
the two organizations. Thus, it appears that the superpowers do not have
complete and immediate control over the extent of their involvement
when they render aid to another state.
The "utopian" situation of the scenarios realistically calls for an
intermediate step-action by the Security Council-while a "realistic"
course of action which avoids the Security Council results in direct
involvement of the two superpowers. It might be reasoned that the
creation of opposing collective-defense organizations results in a zero-
sum-game relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States
in which the winnings of one become the losses of the other. Against
the real interests of the superpowers, support given to rival states has
the potential of confrontation in the real sense.
The reconciliation between a utopian and a real world is at best
difficult. This has been an attempt to view the real world from the
viewpoint of a utopian. It seems that in their own way the framers of
the United Nations Charter were careful to attempt to separate the
concept of collective self-defense from that of regional organizations. It
was done so that regional organizations would have the potential to
become stabilizing forces that could be called upon by the Security
Council to enforce decisions. The deterioration of relations among the
allies after the close of the Second World War led to the formation of
quasi-regional organizations which in fact have done little towards sta-
19721
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bilizing the world situation as a whole. If the United Nations were a
truly effective collective-security orranization, with regional organiza-
tions playing a proper role, the potential for conflict would approach
zero.
